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FOREWORD
There must be a beginning of any great matter, but the continuing unto the end
until it be thoroughly ﬁnished yields the true glory.
Sir Francis Drake

Sooner or later it seems, all great powers have found themselves
in Afghanistan, and their experience is replete with bitter resistance,
harsh conditions, and failure. In contrast to its predecessors, the
United States came not as a conqueror, but as a liberator. Equally
unprecedented, the United States seeks to reinstitute Afghanistan as
a fully sovereign and functioning state.
In this monograph, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond A. Millen
examines warlordism as the principal impediment to Afghanistan’s
revival and offers a shift in strategy that addresses the war of
ideas, the counternarcotics initiative, and the incorporation of the
Afghan National Army into the provincial reconstruction teams. As
Lieutenant Colonel Millen observes, all the resources are in place;
they simply need a shift in focus.
Lieutenant Colonel Millen takes into account the historical,
cultural, and economic factors that impede central authority and the
reforms needed for modern states. His problem-solving approach is
insightful, pragmatic, and innovative.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph
as a topic of debate concerning post-conﬂict operations and counterinsurgency warfare.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Over 2 decades of incessant warfare destroyed Afghanistan as
a functioning state, fracturing its institutions and devastating its
economy. In the maelstrom of incessant internecine ﬁghting in the
1990s, the Taliban clawed its way to power and installed a medieval
regime, providing stability through brutality. The Taliban regime
likely would have defeated the last of the resisting warlords and
continued its rule had Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda not provoked the
United States into a war with the Taliban as a result of September 11,
2001 (9-11). The swift expulsion of the Taliban and al Qaeda militants
resulted in yet another regime change, but it did not ameliorate the
fundamental malaise afﬂicting Afghanistan―warlordism. Because of
their power and wealth, Afghan warlords and their militias represent
the greatest challenge to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation as a functioning
state, but any strategy which seeks a direct confrontation with them
will likely ignite a war. Ultimately, resuscitation of Afghanistan lies
with the Afghan people, and government policies must be geared
towards garnering their loyalty and trust.
It would be a mistake to demonize the warlords, however.
Without a doubt, they and their militias had a hand in the ruination
of Afghanistan, but they are also regarded as patriots and providers
of security and livelihood. One must recognize that xenophobia,
regionalism, and distrust of centralized authority are entrenched in
Afghan society. It therefore follows that the warlords will attempt
to safeguard their powerbase by maintaining a well-armed militia,
proﬁting from the opium market, and preserving the allegiance
of their constituents. President Hamid Karzai certainly recognizes
the dynamic tensions keeping Afghanistan intact but could just as
quickly tear it asunder if he miscalculates. In this sense, it would be
more prudent to view each warlord as a latent insurgent rather than
a mere nuisance to the central government.
Recognizing warlordism as Afghanistan’s salient challenge
requires no radical shift in strategy. For the most part, the resources
are in place; they simply need a shift in emphasis. This monograph
proposes a slight shift in coalition strategy, placing greater stress
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on three approaches: 1) initiating a sophisticated public awareness
campaign to win the war of ideas; 2) weaning Afghan society off
the opium market; and 3) ending the culture of warlordism without
sparking an insurgency.
The public awareness campaign must be an open and public
enterprise, and should not carry any hint of subterfuge. In this
nation of Madison Avenue and Hollywood certainly, the various
information media have no qualms with unabashedly inﬂuencing
American cultural behavior, so marketing ideas in support of policy
objectives would be no great leap. A sophisticated public awareness
campaign requires the marrying of marketing experts with the
expatriate Afghan artists in order to entertain Afghan citizens ﬁrst,
and foremost, then inform and persuade them, as well as rebut
adversarial propaganda. Once ﬁrmly established in the Afghan
society, the media can be adapted to address any variety of issues―
Islamic extremism, the opium trade, warlord oppression, and the
virtues of the Afghan National Army.
The failure of the counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan
reﬂects fundamental inattentiveness to the economics of the opium
culture, the potential ethical and social forces, and the opiate
processing nodes. The central actors in weaning Afghanistan off
opium are the farmers. Persuading the farmer to grow legitimate
crops requires crop subsidies that permit proﬁts equal to opium and
access to foreign markets. Although subsidies may be exorbitant,
given that 75 percent of the world’s opiates come from Afghanistan,
it is actually cheaper to pay off farmers as compared to the costs
associated with national and international drug interdiction, law
enforcement, and criminal prosecution. Permitting greater access to
global markets is a matter of lifting trade barriers. Because nearly all
the heroin in Europe originates in Afghanistan, a major incentive to
relax Europe’s agricultural trade barriers with Afghanistan exists.
Moreover, the United Nations (UN) can assist in providing special
access into Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Addressing the ethical and social aspects of poppy cultivation is
a powerful tool in targeting Afghan behavior. In this regard, a public
awareness campaign would be particularly effective in reaching the
greatest audience. Making an appeal that narcotics violate the tenets
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of Islam and are dishonorable will likely resonate with the deeply
religious Afghan citizens.
The British and American forces in Afghanistan are assisting in
training and supporting Afghan drug interdiction forces. In view
of the limited opium processing plants and smuggling routes, the
central government can apply pressure against the warlords and
their lieutenants without hurting the farmers directly. This approach
is less volatile than attempting to eradicate poppy growth directly.
In view of the ease and speed with which poppies are grown, as well
as the ﬁnancial investment farmers have in their ﬁelds, focusing on
interdiction will likely be more effective over time than hunting for
will-o-the-wisp poppy ﬁelds.
Ending the culture of warlordism would represent the culmination
of effort in Afghanistan. In order to end this culture, an alternative
must be available. Warlords provide two commodities for their
constituents―security and a livelihood. The central government and
coalition can assume both commodities using the Afghan National
Army (ANA) and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). The
ANA has only recently achieved the necessary numbers to establish
a presence in the provinces. Some may decry this use of the ANA as
a diversion from its main task of providing security (e.g., ﬁghting
insurgents). The fact is that the coalition has been managing the
Taliban/al Qaeda insurgency for the past 4 years, and for practical
purposes, this insurgency is defanged. Although insurgent remnants
may continue low level activities for years, the Afghan police forces
should be able to shoulder a greater part of the burden in 2005.
Under these circumstances, the ANA can bolster the legitimacy of
the central government by establishing security and participating in
local projects that resonate with the people, such as reconstruction,
agricultural events, and ceremonies. The increased interaction
between the ANA and the local Afghans will enhance recruitment of
quality soldiers and provide a tangible association with the central
government.
Correspondingly, the coalition PRTs are an excellent vehicle for
introducing the ANA and perhaps police forces into the provinces, as
well as providing local employment through reconstruction projects.
The number and size of PRTs can increase, with the increase of ANA
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soldiers into them. PRTs may be the best method for transforming
international ﬁnancial aid into reconstruction and local vocational
training. Providing labor and skills to local individuals is an effective
way to help the Afghans help themselves. In the long term, providing
manual labor tools for dozens of workers and supervising the work
projects over a period of weeks may yield a greater payoff than a
PRT conducting reconstruction with bulldozers, backhoes, and other
equipment in a matter of days. The use of PRTs with ANA soldiers
offers an unobtrusive way to increase the presence and inﬂuence
of the central government without a direct confrontation with the
warlords. Their use also provides a benign way for Afghanistan to
permit the passage of warlordism into history.
Recommendations:
•

Adapt ways and means to support the main objective―the
legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the Afghan
people.

•

Invest resources for a public media campaign and test it in
Afghanistan. Adapt it to other operations in the pursuit of the
global war on terror.

•

Wean Afghan society off the opium market by targeting the
economics of the trade, emphasizing the un-Islam dimensions
of illicit drugs, and interdicting the trade before it leaves
Afghanistan.

•

Invest heavily in PRTs and then populate with ANA soldiers
and coalition cadre.

•

Remain cognizant of Afghanistan’s propensity towards
xenophobia, regionalism, and conﬂict when executing sector
security reform and supporting stratagems.
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AFGHANISTAN:
RECONSTITUTING A COLLAPSED STATE
Preconceived notions, especially in war, are dangerous, because they give their
own particular colour to all information that comes in; and . . . stiﬂe any real
understanding of the actual situation . . .
General Aleksei A. Brusilov

Introduction.
Every insurgency is unique, requiring a unique counterinsurgency
strategy. The most egregious error in conducting a counterinsurgency
campaign is to attempt a cookie-cutter approach from one insurgency
to another. Afghanistan’s uniqueness stems not from the series of
insurgencies that have plagued the state for over 2 decades; rather,
it is the state of commonplace lawlessness that challenges the central
government, coalition, and the United Nations (UN).
The collapse of Afghanistan as a state can be traced to events
leading up to and including the Soviet Union’s invasion in December
1979.1 During their 1980-88 war to destroy the mujahidin insurgents,
the Soviets destroyed the socio-economic fabric of Afghanistan by
killing 1.3 million Afghans, expelling another 5.5 million, destroying
crops and irrigation systems, bombing granaries, razing villages,
mining pastures and ﬁelds, and killing livestock.2 The withdrawal
of the Soviet army in 1989 led to a further descent into chaos as
mujahidin insurgents continued to ﬁght the communist government,
which slowly lost control of Afghanistan over the next 4 years.3
The mujahidin, or more accurately at this stage in the conﬂict, the
warlord militias, did not discriminate between combatants and
noncombatants. From 1992 through 1994, militia forces killed
between 40,000 to 50,000 noncombatants in the course of ﬁghting
around Kabul alone. Their sheer rapacity throughout Afghanistan
simply ravaged the economy.4 The rise of the Taliban in 1994 only
exchanged rapacity for a medieval reign, but the civil war continued
until the U.S.-supported Afghan Militia Forces (warlord militias)
ousted the Taliban in late 2001.5
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By the time President Hamid Karzai’s Islamic Transitional
Government of Afghanistan was established as a result of the
December 2001 Bonn Agreement, Afghanistan was in the worst sense
a collapsed state as described by William Zartman.6 Afghanistan could
no longer perform the basic functions of a sovereign government.
It no longer possessed a decisionmaking center of government;
centralized law and order were nonexistent, and social cohesion
only existed at the tribal level; it was no longer a symbol of identity,
as the inhabitants reserved their allegiance to their warlords or tribal
chiefs; and it had lost its domestic legitimacy as it could not provide
any socioeconomic services to the citizens.7 Twenty-three years of
war had destroyed all vestiges of state functions.
Regarding the road to rehabilitation, Zartman recommends
reversing the process of collapse as follows: 1) the central government
must gain control of its state agents (functioning, uncorrupt military
and police forces, subordinated to the government); 2) government
authorities must practice positive politics (elections, platforms,
and legislation); 3) the central government must make progressive
reforms (not eschew difﬁcult decisions); 4) the central government
must expand its political power base beyond the immediate circle
or capital; and 5) the central government must extend its authority
throughout the state so that local warlords and neighboring states do
not ﬁll the vacuum.8 Technically, Zartman is correct in his assessment,
and technically, the UN-mandated International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) is attempting to reverse the process with its Sector
Security Reform (SSR) strategy.9 However, rebuilding Afghanistan’s
sovereignty is not a matter of putting the pieces back in place and
hoping Afghanistan will reanimate automatically as a functioning
state.
It may surprise some to know that the main purveyors of
Afghanistan’s continued lawlessness are the warlords and not the
Taliban/al Qaeda militants. Because of their power and wealth,
Afghan warlords and their militias represent the greatest challenge
to Afghanistan’s rehabilitation, but a confrontational strategy with
them will likely lead to widespread ﬁghting. Coalition strategy must
not forget that the ultimate medium for change resides in the Afghan
people, and every aspect of SSR must nurture their allegiance towards
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and trust in the Afghan central government. Afghanistan’s domestic
legitimacy necessitates this recognition. For the most part, the needed
resources for strategy implementation are readily available and only
require a change in focus.
This monograph proposes a slight shift in coalition strategy,
placing greater stress on three approaches: 1) initiating a
sophisticated public awareness campaign to win the war of ideas;
2) weaning Afghan society off the opium market; and 3) ending
the culture of warlordism without sparking an insurgency. As this
monograph will seek to demonstrate, all elements of this strategy are
mutually supporting and synergistic. This strategy not only creates a
compelling methodology for restoring Afghanistan as a functioning
state, but it also possesses tools useful for similar nation-building
efforts elsewhere.
The Warlord Gordian Knot.
Recognizing that the warlords are the central problem to
Afghanistan’s future is one thing, but ﬁnding a way to deal with
them is quite another. Not only were the warlords and their militias
the freedom ﬁghters against the Soviet occupation, they were also
the principal allies of the United States against the Taliban and al
Qaeda.10 Not surprisingly, the United States continues “to rely on the
independent warlords for help hunting down remnant units of the
Taliban and al Qaeda.”11 And as the central government and coalition
pursue a host of activities, the warlord militias still function as a
home guard, protecting their provinces from militant inﬁltration.
Yet, the warlords and their militias are a double-edged sword.
Despite their service to Afghanistan, they and their militias are not
yielding to the authority of Karzai’s central government. Three years
have passed since the UN stipulated the subordination of the 200
or more warlords and their militias to the central government.12
The principal vehicle for the dissolution of the militias is the
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) initiative
as part of the Japanese-led Afghan New Beginnings Program
(ANBP). In early 2003, ANBP established an arbitrary DDR target
goal of 100,000 militiamen because the true size of the Afghan Militia
Force was unknown and remains unknown due to warlord and
3

militia commander obstructionism.13 United Kingdom (UK) Colonel
Peter Babbington, who is responsible for executing DDR, regards
the necessity for warlord compliance as the fatal ﬂaw in the whole
process, with a persistent gulf between their words and deeds.14
Warlords and militia leaders are able to shroud their troop strengths
by paying their militiamen with proﬁts from the illicit opium trade.
Without government ﬁscal oversight, the true size of the militia
forces is not knowable; hence force estimates have ranged wildly
from 60,000 to 250,000.15 Militia end-strengths are practically a side
issue, though, since few militia forces (under 17,000) have processed
through DDR, and those that have are considered by the warlords as
the most expendable.16 Moreover, contrary to the spirit of DDR, the
warlords have turned in obsolete, incomplete, and nonfunctioning
weapons and equipment for the ﬂedgling Afghan National Army
(ANA), reserving the most modern and well-maintained weapons
and equipment for their militia.17 One conclusion is incontestable:
DDR alone will not defang the warlords.
In response to warlord recalcitrance, Karzai recently proclaimed
warlord militias as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, a threat even
greater than the Taliban insurgents, and that he planned to institute
new measures to disarm them.18 Exactly what new measures Karzai
intends to employ are inscrutable. In the past he has used various
stratagems to pare the power of various warlords: persuading some
to comply with DDR and co-opting others by appointing them as
provincial governors, cabinet ministers, and to similar positions;19
and in some cases, deploying elements of the ANA ostensibly to quell
ﬁghting among warlords, but in reality, a subtle way of establishing
his authority without being too confrontational. His boldest and
riskiest move was the recent dismissal of Ismail Khan, the governor
of the Herat province and a warlord thought to be untouchable.
Throughout his political maneuvering, Karzai remains sensitive
to honoring the past sacriﬁces and patriotism of the warlords and
militia. Reﬂecting Karzai’s sensitivities, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad avers that the government must balance the use of force
with incentives when addressing the warlords and their militias:
“There must be a place of honor for those who cooperate.”20
Such a measured approach is much more than yielding to
nostalgia. A government and coalition military campaign to crush
4

the warlords would likely lead to renewed ﬁghting or even a full
ﬂedged insurrection. Afghanistan has a “long tradition of resistance to
central authority and foreign interference.”21 A product of numerous
historical invasions and compartmentalized geography, Afghan
society is actually a quilt-work of “village states” comprising various
tribes and ethnicities. The basic subnational unit is the Qawm, a social
“identity based on kinship, residence, and sometimes occupation.”22
When not ﬁghting foreign invaders, Afghans have a rich history of
internecine warfare among regions or between warlords and the
central government due to tribal rivalries, ungovernable tribes,
blood feuds, and chieftain ambitions. With loyalties devolving to
the family and tribe, progress at the national level remains a slow
process, but from the Afghan perspective, these arrangements also
serve to protect the Qawm from an oppressive central government or
invader.23
It would be wise to regard Afghan warlordism as a latent
insurgency. Regardless of any exigencies justifying the use of force
against the warlords, even small operations risk sparking a visceral
uprising that could easily spread throughout Afghanistan. The
Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) insurgents
would be quick to exploit this change in fortunes for a revival of their
jihad against the West.24 Hence, confronted by powerful and often
irascible warlords, a low-level insurgent threat from the Taliban and
other militants, and a country left destitute by 23 years of warfare, the
central government and coalition must be open to new approaches if
the path to a functioning state is to continue.
Public Awareness Campaign.
A public awareness campaign is an integral part of information
operations, but it should not be regarded as merely a news provider
or a clandestine operation. A sophisticated public awareness
campaign seeks to engage its audience by being entertaining, ﬁrst
and foremost. In the process, it weaves in daily themes to inform
and persuade the public, and to rebut adversarial propaganda. To
illustrate, the U.S. propaganda efforts during World War II provide a
useful framework for reference. The Ofﬁce of Strategic Services (OSS)
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designed a clandestine media operation to connect with the German
people and soldiers by recruiting German and Austrian expatriate
actors, musicians, comedians, and playwrights to produce radio
programs, which provided entertainment while subtlely weaving
in OSS themes. The expatriates possessed the linguistic, cultural,
and political skills needed to resonate with German listeners.25 The
operation was a resounding success, albeit never advertised even
after the war. German soldiers and civilians eagerly but secretly
tuned into the programs for their entertainment value. The subtle
messages and humor poking fun at the Nazi regime had the desired
effect and even prompted an uprising in Bavaria near the end of the
war.26
Care must be taken not to use the public awareness campaign
for deception, which is a speciﬁc intelligence operation aimed at
deluding enemy leaders.27 Deception performs a valuable service
during a conﬂict, but in this role it would be counterproductive
because credibility is crucial. A public awareness campaign should
be an open enterprise and rely on facts to inform and persuade the
public.
To launch the campaign with the greatest and most immediate
effect, the coalition should recruit expatriate Afghan entertainers
and journalists from coalition member states for radio and television
programs. Naturally, qualiﬁed Afghans living in Afghanistan would
be eligible, and close cooperation with the Afghan government would
be a prerequisite for such an operation. Like the German case, only
these professionals possess the requisite skills to reach the Afghan
people. To provide coherence of effort, the production staff should
be comprised of professional marketing and media executives,
anthropologists, and government policy ofﬁcials (both U.S. and
Afghan). Because Afghanistan is comprised of diverse ethnic groups
and languages (Pashtu, Dari, and Turkic, among others), the programs
would need to adapt the content for the targeted audience.
Approximately 36 percent of the population is literate,28 so the
campaign should rely predominantly on the visual and oral media. In
this pursuit, the enterprise would require an investment in sufﬁcient
station equipment, studios, and towers to cover all of Afghanistan, as
well as enough transistor radios and televisions (for community TV
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centers) for adequate reach. Because of the mountainous geography,
satellite radio and television transmissions may be better. Besides the
entertainment value with interwoven themes, the programs could
gradually expand to panel debates, talk shows, and so forth, so as to
air differing viewpoints, hearsay, and grievances. It stands to reason
that once the audience grows, the law of economics will take over
and the programs will turn a proﬁt. By opening a public dialogue, the
people will not be as susceptible to extremist rhetoric, rumors, and
disinformation. Feedback through surveys and polls will enhance the
quality of the public awareness campaign. Initially, the public media
focus should be on the insurgents, but as the medium matures, it can
shift to other issues, such as the opium problem, warlord corruption,
the progress of the ANA, and other government initiatives.
Despite the intrinsic value of a public media campaign, the U.S.
Government may be reticent to adopt it due to preconceived ideas.
In a recent article, Charles Krohn, a former deputy chief of public
affairs in Iraq, believes that, in general, Americans view public media
operations as dishonorable and underhanded.29 Krohn develops his
thesis further. Ironically, the media is engrained in American culture
because it is used to market ideas (e.g., speeches, press conferences,
and news programs) and to market products (e.g., basic advertising,
the armed forces, and coalitions). A public media campaign in reality
is a form of advertising, and the product is the promotion of democracy
as well as the free exchange of ideas. Regional Islamic extremists
and their afﬁliates readily and unabashedly attempt to marginalize
the United States in the war of ideas, so refusing to engage the local
citizens in this arena places the coalition on the defensive. The public
awareness campaign seeks to win the allegiance of the undecided,
and the initial step in separating the extremists from the moderate
Moslems is to persuade them that the efforts of the United States are
noble and to their beneﬁt.30
The appropriate agency for the public media campaign should
probably lie in the government-civilian sector. Mr. Krohn observes
that the Department of Defense has made such operations an
unintended secret enterprise by relegating them to psychological
operations (PSYOP) units within the Special Operations Command.31
The Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) and the ISAF
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operate ﬁve PSYOP radio stations, and CFC-A supports numerous
independent radio stations for PSYOP and public affairs messages.32
CFC-A also uses Afghanistan’s existing radio and TV stations,
as well as the international media, to disseminate information.33
Because surveys have revealed that radio is the most effective
media for spreading messages, CFC-A gives away transistor radios
to Afghans.34 The question remains whether these efforts resonate
effectively with the Afghan people. More importantly, does the fact
that PSYOP units operate these stations evoke any suspicions with
the Afghans? In the long term, a professional media effort operating
as a public service will most likely provide the greatest payoff.
Resolving Afghanistan’s Addiction to Opium.
With its poppy cultivation increasing unabated, Afghanistan
produces 75 percent of the world’s illicit opium.35 Years of poverty,
conﬂict, and shattered central authority have created, or signiﬁcantly
contributed to, the entrenchment of opium in Afghan society.
Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation has gained international attention
because it exacerbates drug problems in other countries, and its
drug trade provides tremendous wealth for organized crime and
terrorist organizations.36 Poppy growth in Afghanistan is rampant,
taking place in 28 of the 32 provinces. Farmers are drawn to poppy
cultivation because poppies are easy to grow in arid climates and
generate vastly greater proﬁts than other crops. For example, the aid
organization, German Agro Action, estimates that proﬁts for opium
are $600 to $1,000 per kilogram, as opposed to $1 per kilogram for
rice or wheat.37 Afghanistan could easily become a narco-state with
trafﬁckers and drug lords increasing their hold over the farmers and
the economy, generating billions in proﬁts and providing between
50 to 60 percent of Afghanistan’s economy. Although the farmers are
drawn to poppy cultivation for a living, the majority of the proﬁts go
to the trafﬁckers, warlords, militia leaders, and even the Taliban, al
Qaeda, and Hizb-i-Islami (HIG).38
Earlier errors by the UK and the UN contributed to Afghanistan’s
current socio-economic addiction to opium. In accordance with its
counternarcotics strategy, the British paid poppy farmers to eradicate
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their crops for legal crops; however the strategy backﬁred because it
prompted other farmers to start growing poppies in order to enjoy the
windfall as well. The UN alternative crops program failed because
the UN imported wheat into Afghanistan at the same time Afghan
farmers were growing wheat. As a result, the UN unintentionally
crippled the domestic market for Afghan wheat farmers.39
Although U.S. and other agencies have discussed using the U.S.
military in counternarcotics efforts, to include crop eradication,
both carry unintended consequences. Senior U.S. military and
civilian leaders recommend conﬁning the antidrug campaign to law
enforcement. “Enmeshing U.S. troops in drug ﬁghts . . . would alienate
many Afghans―some of whom have become useful intelligence
sources―and also divert attention from the core U.S. military missions
of combating insurgents and aiding reconstruction.”40 Aid workers
warn that Afghans depend on the opium trade for their livelihood,
and senior coalition military leaders believe eradication could spark
an additional insurgency by the warlords.41 The one imperative of
the counternarcotics campaign must be to avoid driving the Afghans
into the arms of the warlords.
The counternarcotics strategy should target three poppy pressure
points in Afghanistan: the economic, the ethical/social, and the
opiate processing nodal points. The UN Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime
asserts that the laws of economics can be used to diminish the
opium market.42 The United States and European Union (EU) should
subsidize legal crops, paying farmers as much for them as they would
receive for opium. Although such subsidies appear exorbitant, given
the amount of money and resources devoted to combating drug
trafﬁcking globally, shifting more money to nip the market in the bud
seems relatively cheap.43 The UN, United States, and EU can bolster
Afghanistan’s legal agricultural exports by providing greater access
to foreign markets. In 2004, 35 countries worldwide required external
food assistance: 24 in Africa, 5 in Asia/Near East, 5 in Latin America,
and 1 in Europe.44 Because Europe receives the lion’s share of opiates
from Afghanistan, representing 95 percent of its heroin consumption,
it is in the EU’s best interests to relax some provisions of its Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), permitting Afghan agricultural products
into the EU.45 In this case, the EU could collaborate with Afghanistan
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to import a high value agricultural product for European consumers.
The UN can permit greater agricultural access to other needed areas as
well to provide an enduring market. The bottom line must transcend
domestic agricultural concerns and barriers and permit Afghanistan
to develop its agricultural market so as to undercut the illegal opium
market. Understandably, the warlords will likely coerce these proﬁts
from the farmers, but the immediate goal is to interrupt poppy
cultivation long enough for the institutional knowledge to dissipate
and the market to shift to other regions. Once this shift occurs, then
the government can focus on warlord racketeering.
Increasing comprehension through the public awareness
campaign accentuates the unethical aspects of poppy cultivation.
Speciﬁcally, the media campaign would target Afghan ethical
values by emphasizing that opium consumption is against the tenets
of Islam and is dishonorable.46 For those Afghans that rationalize
opium consumption as affecting only nonbelievers, the public
awareness campaign should emphasize the legal ramiﬁcations of
getting caught, as well as the human tragedy stories related to opium
use among Afghans. Highlighting one’s honor in this enterprise
taps into the Afghan psyche. Lastly, emphasizing that warlords and
Islamic extremists are reaping huge proﬁts from the drug trade,
while Afghans struggle with poverty, helps to isolate the former
from Afghan society.
A greater emphasis on targeting processing laboratories and
movement of opium products places pressure on the drug lords
without affecting the farmers directly. Only around 12 industrial
labs process the opium into heroin in the northern, eastern, and
southern provinces. Forty percent is smuggled through Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, and other northern states, whereas 30 percent goes
through Iran and Pakistan.47 In response, the British have trained
an Afghan narcotics interdiction force, and existing counternarcotics
police units are expanding. A special judiciary task force comprising
prosecutors and judges is planned to operate in a secure facility near
Kabul. Moreover, the U.S. military plans to support Afghan narcotics
interdiction operations with airlift and intelligence to increase border
security.48 Ostensibly, attempting to interdict the ﬁnished product
appears much more difﬁcult than simply eradicating poppy ﬁelds,
but in 2004 alone, an estimated 321,236 acres were used for poppy
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growth, much of it in small, isolated ﬁelds.49 Because poppies are so
easy to grow in Afghanistan, farmers can rapidly establish new ﬁelds
as fast as they are eradicated. Focusing intelligence and interdiction
forces on processing laboratories and smuggling routes makes more
practical sense than attempting to scour Afghanistan for poppy
ﬁelds, and the farmers are not directly affected.
If the opium market can be eliminated in Afghanistan, the
resulting diminution of global supplies and higher prices will cause
the opium/heroin market to collapse. Even if opium cultivation
shifts to other countries, such as Myanmar and Laos, their low
opium yield areas will not restore supply levels for cheap heroin at
the current level. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Afghans would
not grow poppies if a viable agricultural market was available. In
this regard, integrating the ethics of the illicit drug trade into the
counternarcotics campaign is a powerful tool in Afghanistan’s deeply
religious culture. Persuading the EU to relax its Common Agricultural
Policy to accept Afghan agricultural products will be much more
difﬁcult, but the heavy consumption of heroin in Europe provides
a powerful incentive. Lastly, concentrating on the processing and
smuggling nodal points makes greater use of the ﬁnite intelligence
and interdiction forces. With the loss of their largest source of wealth,
the warlords would not be able to maintain their militia forces at
current levels and they would ﬁnd their power ﬂagging. In short,
the counternarcotics campaign has the greatest potential for setting
Afghanistan on a progressive course.
Ending the Culture of Warlordism.
The warlords provide two services for their constituents―security
and employment―which in turn generate local fealty. For the central
government to challenge the warlords’ traditional position in Afghan
society, it must present an image which resonates with the average
citizen. Ultimately, the central government wants to be the primary
authority in Afghanistan, but it risks sparking an uprising if it becomes
too confrontational. In this regard, a steady encroachment into the
provinces stands a better chance of a peaceful change in authority.
Since Karzai is co-opting many warlords into the government, the
transition to legitimate central authority is complementary.
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Currently, the ANA is the embodiment of the central government
and has the greatest potential concerning citizen identiﬁcation with
the central government. As such, it becomes necessary to promote
a greater presence of the ANA in the provinces, even though this
measure may provoke an outcry within the military because of its
diversion from a traditional security role. Nonetheless, the ANA has
two stated missions: to protect the national government and to project
government authority and inﬂuence throughout all the provinces. Hence,
a greater ANA presence in the provinces would be an appropriate
role.50
Critics still may question whether assigning the ANA to an
essentially image-enhancing role rather than ﬁghting insurgents is
not counterproductive. After all, the idea behind training the ANA
is to permit the central government to assume the task of security
rather than relying on coalition forces. Realistically, CFC-A has been
fulﬁlling this security mission for several years, and during this
window of opportunity, the ANA can be utilized for greater political
effect.51 The 18,000 coalition forces and the Pakistani forces across
the border have successfully neutralized the Taliban, al Qaeda, and
HIG insurgents. The greatest indication of Taliban weakness was its
inability to interrupt the October 9, 2004, presidential election. Recent
revelations indicate that rivalries within Taliban ranks, internal
dissension, and loss of its former Pakistani sponsors have severely
reduced its capabilities.52 More promising, Taliban militants recently
have indicated that they wish to lay down their arms in exchange for
amnesty.53 Residual Taliban and al Qaeda militants may possess the
funding and capability to continue a low level insurgency for years,
but the threat will remain manageable, especially once Afghanistan’s
law enforcement assumes a greater role.54
To date, the Germans have trained 20,000 policemen with
an ultimate goal of 50,000 policemen by 2005 and 12,000 border
police thereafter. The U.S. Department of State has built four police
academies, with another two planned.55 Law enforcement agencies
will become more professional as better vetting of recruits, greater
salaries, and adequate equipment are introduced.56 Since the coalition
has the insurgency contained, it only makes sense to focus the ANA
where it can do the most good, and that is to extend the authority of
the central government throughout the provinces.
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In view of Afghanistan’s traditions and history, the question arises
whether the ANA can compete with the militia forces for the pride
and respect of the local citizens. The warlord militia forces probably
enjoy some residual approbation as a result of the mythological lore
that surrounds the mujahidin, but they are also stigmatized by their
predacious behavior throughout the warring years. It is well-known
that the warlords were responsible for pre-Taliban oppression and
atrocities that pervaded Afghanistan after the Soviets withdrew.
Presently, many warlords and militia forces are complicit in the
opium market, corruption, extortion, and intimidation of Afghan
citizens.57 Notwithstanding the contrast in ethical behavior, the ANA
is better trained, disciplined, and led than the militia forces.58
This sanguine assessment may be surprising in view of the ANA’s
precarious start. Established in May 2002, the ANA has a headline
goal of 70,000 by 2008. As previously mentioned, the warlords only
contributed their worst soldiers and equipment to the national army,
and the majority of recruits were pressed into service. Consequently,
desertion rates as high as 50 percent plagued the ANA due to poor
motivation, low pay, corruption, and hazing. The second half of
2004 revealed a leveling off of the high attrition primarily due to
military and government reforms, although the specter of Soviet
military doctrine may linger in some circles.59 To secure the ANA’s
recruitment base, the coalition has established 23 National Army
Volunteer Centers throughout Afghanistan, with a ﬁnal goal of 35.
The ANA has the capacity to train 3,000 recruits organized into four
training battalions every 10 weeks. By September 2004, the ANA had
an end-strength of 13,400, with an expected end-strength of 16,000
by the end of 2004.60 Thus, the ANA now has the numbers to start
making an impact throughout Afghanistan.
The media awareness campaign can enhance the ANA’s image
in the eyes of the people through general advertisements but also
by ANA participation in reconstruction programs, farming projects,
ceremonial events, and presence patrols in villages. Devoting air time
to soldiers helping to rebuild the country and rendering assistance
to the people not only enhances the appeal of the ANA, but also
establishes a national bond between the people and the central
government. Consequently, recruitment of quality volunteers for
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national service will gain momentum, extending the appeal of the
central government and loosening the regional parochialism. Given
the choice between the militia and the ANA, Afghan youths will
increasingly choose the ANA.
Correspondingly, the coalition provincial reconstruction
teams (PRT) are an excellent vehicle for introducing the ANA and
perhaps police forces into the provinces, as well as providing local
employment through reconstruction projects. PRTs already conduct a
host of activities in consultation with the local authorities that extend
the authority and legitimacy of the central government through
reconstruction projects, good governance initiatives, promotion of
security, and other SSR related projects.61 Currently, the coalition
operates 19 PRTs in the north and west, with future expansion to the
south and east planned. Still, the PRTs are relatively small, ranging in
size from 50 to 500 soldiers and depending on coalition member states
to ﬁll the ranks, a precarious source of manpower.62 Incorporating
ANA soldiers into PRTs would permit an increase in the number
and size of PRTs, as well as enhancing local cooperation, trust, and
security. Through an expanded PRT labor and training program,
local people could acquire new vocational skills, employment, and
self-worth.
The interface between the PRTs and local ofﬁcials has been
facilitated by the central government’s Afghan Reconstruction
Group, which organizes reconstruction efforts among the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), UN, Afghan agencies, and
nongovernment organizations (NGOs).63 Moreover, the central
government has established the “National Solidarity Program
which seeks to create local governing councils and to empower these
councils to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities.”64
Reckoning that democracy in Afghanistan is best cultivated at the
local level, the development council members are elected by secret
ballot. By giving the inhabitants a voice and assistance, they can
reconstruct the country on their own.65 With this in mind and because
the Afghans will inevitably assume the task of reconstruction, it may
serve the interests of the coalition to place more ANA soldiers under
coalition leadership into the PRTs.
PRTs may be the best method for transforming international
ﬁnancial aid into reconstruction and local vocational training.
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Although it is troubling that international aid pledges have proven
to be more rhetoric than reality, reconstruction and assistance efforts
must continue.66 PRTs can become the primary means for translating
aid into assistance. PRTs are best placed to maximize monetary and
equipment contributions by employing local labor. From an Afghan
perspective, it may be more self-afﬁrming for local Afghans and
PRT personnel to work with picks, shovels, and wheelbarrows over
a period of weeks rather than watch a PRT accomplish the same task
alone with dump trucks, bulldozers, and backhoes in a week. Which
method builds stronger bonds? Supplemented by a public awareness
campaign, PRTs can become the locomotion of rapid reconstruction
and social change to the farthest reaches of Afghanistan.
The use of PRTs is not without controversy though. NGOs in
Afghanistan believe they confuse the local inhabitants, who cannot
differentiate between PRTs and NGOs. NGOs fear compromise
by association,67 and many practice strict impartiality and eschew
coordination with military forces and government authorities
as a matter of political philosophy.68 This distinct separation is,
from the standpoint of the NGOs, nonnegotiable. For coalition
and central government efforts, this arrangement translates into
some redundancies and inefﬁciencies. This leads to a meditative
question: are NGOs a valued commodity to post-conﬂict operations
or an obstacle to recovery? Afghanistan’s Ministry of Planning has
2,296 NGOs and 321 international governmental organizations
(IGOs) registered in its books, but only 100 are well-established
organizations.69 Ramazan Bachardoust, the former head of the
Ministry of Planning, has claimed that most of the NGOs are not
legitimate aid organizations and are only interested in the money.70
Fair or not, the spreading perception among Afghans that NGOs are
motivated by proﬁts rather than reconstruction and assistance badly
tarnishes their image, resulting in hostility and noncooperation.
Add to this stigma the fact that NGOs and IGOs cannot visit parts
of Afghanistan because of the security risks, the need for more PRTs
becomes imperative. The intent of this section is not to denigrate
NGOs, but merely to point out that self-serving aid organizations in
Afghanistan have compromised the standing of NGOs. By necessity,
military organizations like CFC-A will take a pragmatic stance,
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devoid of niceties―reinforce success, not failure. In this regard, PRTs
have greater potential and should get the resources.
Expanding the role of the ANA and the PRTs into the provinces
increasingly will provide security and jobs. The increased interaction
between the ANA and the local Afghans will enhance recruitment of
quality soldiers and provide a tangible association with the central
government. PRTs have the potential to generate jobs and skill sets
among the local citizens, as well as increasing their sense of security
and stability. Once law and order becomes self-perpetuating, the
inﬂuence of the warlords will fade. The task of the central government
is to set the conditions for the graceful exit of warlordism.
Conclusions.
Turning Afghanistan into a functioning state would be a very
difﬁcult enterprise, even without an ongoing insurgency, illicit
opium market, and powerful warlords. As current trends portend,
SSR will not fail catastrophically per se, but neither will it achieve
the desired end state. Warlords remain the most virulent obstacle
to Afghanistan’s future as a self-functioning and sovereign state.
Because an open confrontation with the warlords would likely spark
a widespread insurgency, which the Taliban, al Qaeda, and HIG
would exploit, the coalition must seek imaginative stratagems to
divorce Afghanistan from warlordism. Winning the hearts and minds
requires an investment in a public awareness campaign, weaning the
society off opium, and providing security and legitimate sources of
livelihood which give Afghans hope in the future. These programs
must complement and supplement SSR.
Recommendations.
• Adapt ways and means to support the main objective―the
legitimacy of the central government in the eyes Afghan
people.
• Invest resources for a public media campaign and test it in
Afghanistan. Adapt it to other operations in the pursuit of the
global war on terror.
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• Wean Afghan society off the opium market by targeting the
economics of the trade, emphasizing the un-Islam dimensions
of illicit drugs, and interdicting the trade before it leaves
Afghanistan.
• Invest heavily in PRTs and then populate with ANA soldiers
and coalition cadre.
• Remain cognizant of Afghanistan’s propensity towards
xenophobia, regionalism, and conﬂict when executing SSR
and supporting stratagems.
Regarding the last recommendation, many warlords are potent
adversaries who will be quick to counter threats to their powerbase.
But, given past warlord oppression and exploitation of the Afghan
people, the aforementioned stratagems provide a powerful means
to isolate the warlords from the people subtlely. Without a source of
revenues and manpower, the majority of warlords will likely reach
the appropriate conclusions, and seek accommodations with the
central government or retire with honor. Should a few warlords opt to
resist and seek a confrontation, the government will have the means
in place to manage the threat. The public awareness campaign will
assist in isolating these recalcitrant warlords politically, and the better
trained and supported ANA will bring them to justice, solidifying the
authority and legitimacy of the central government. The situation in
Afghanistan is unique, but the use of a public awareness campaign,
adaptive economic programs, and PRTs provides a paradigm for
nation-building that resonates with the affected people. Failed states
likely will remain on the international agenda; the leading powers
should pursue effective and cost-effective ways to manage them.
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